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I. INTRODUCTION 
In his dissent in Glossip v. Gross, Justice Breyer declared that 
“[t]he arbitrary imposition of punishment is the antithesis of the rule 
of law.”1 He went on to assert that, for a defendant, to be sentenced 
to death was akin to being struck by lightning.2 Such randomness 
and arbitrariness in capital sentencing results from the wide 
discretion granted to sentencing actors, and runs counter to the 
firmly held belief that every defendant in the criminal justice system 
deserves fair and just treatment.3  
However, these arbitrary sentences are not limited to the capital 
context; they are the result of every sentencing jury determination.4 
In Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia, 
juries determine a defendant’s sentence in the non-capital context.5 
These sentences are the result of broad discretion and little 
guidance.6 As a result, non-capital juries tend to impose sentences 
that are just as arbitrary as those imposed by juries in the capital 
context.7 Such arbitrary sentences run counter to the purpose of jury 
sentencing and undermine the Founders’ belief that the jury is “the 
only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can 
be held to the principles of its constitution.” 8  Because jury 
sentencing tends to produce such arbitrary and unjust results, 9 
                                                 
1.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2759 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
2.  Id. at 2764 (“From a defendant’s perspective, to receive that sentence, and 
certainly to find it implemented, is the equivalent of being struck by lightning. 
How then can we reconcile the death penalty with the demands of a Constitution 
that first and foremost insists upon a rule of law?”).  
3.  Id. at 2759–64 (“The imposition and implementation of the death penalty 
seems capricious, random, indeed arbitrary. From a defendant’s perspective, to 
receive that sentence, and certainly to find it implemented, is the equivalent of 
being struck by lightning. How then can we reconcile the death penalty with the 
demands of a Constitution that first and foremost insists upon a rule of law?”).  
4.  Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Jury Sent’g in Noncapital Cases: 
Comparing Severity and Variance with Jud. Sentences in Two States, 2 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 331, 332 (2005).  
5.  Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sent’g in Prac.: A Three-
State Study, 57 VAN. L. REV. 885, 886 (2004). 
6.  Nancy J. King, How Different is Death? Jury Sent’g in Cap. and Non-
Capital Cases Compared, 2 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 195, 198 (2004).  
7.  See King & Noble, supra note 4, at 332. 
8 .  THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 442 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1993).  
9.  King & Noble, supra note 4, at 332. 
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significant revisions need to be made to the jury sentencing regime 
if such a regime is to continue. 
This article demonstrates that the statutory jury sentencing 
scheme in each of these states contributes significantly to the 
arbitrary nature of sentences imposed, as each sentencing scheme is 
characterized by significant discretion for juries and a lack of 
guidance as to how to wield such discretion.10 It contends that this 
lack of guidance leads to arbitrary and unjust sentences that juries 
ultimately do not feel responsible for imposing. 11  Instead of 
accepting responsibility, 12  jurors tend to place responsibility on 
other actors in the criminal justice system like the defendant, the 
judge, the prosecutor, or the state.13 This trend has been analyzed 
and studied in the capital context but has yet to be explored in the 
non-capital context.14 In fact, numerous studies have demonstrated 
that capital jurors do not feel responsible for the death sentences 
they impose. 15  Instead, capital jurors are insulated from the 
punishment they impose by procedural safeguards surrounding the 
                                                 
10.  Kevin Michael Miller, Romano v. Okla.: The Requirement of Jury’s Sense 
of Resp. and Reliability in Cap. Sent’g, 44 CATH. U.L. REV. 1307, 1318–19 
(1995).  
11 .  William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Choosing Life or Death: 
Sentencing Dynamics in Capital Cases, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF 
THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 319 (James R. Acker, Robert M. Bohm & 
Charles S. Lanier, eds. 1998). 
12.  Throughout this paper, I define responsibility as the sense of accountability 
that jurors experience as a result of the sentence they choose to impose. This 
requires an accurate understanding of what will happen to the defendant as a 
result of the sentence imposed and an appreciation of their role in causing that 
impact on the defendant.  
13.  Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 320; see also Craig Haney, Violence 
and the Cap. Jury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and the Impulse to 
Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1481 (1997) (“[M]any capital jurors 
further distance themselves from the moral implications of this awesome 
responsibility by maintaining the belief that someone else– typically appellate 
judges–will ultimately decide the sentencing question that has been posed to 
them.”).  
14.  King, supra note 6, at 195 (“Capital sentencing research includes extensive 
study of the sentencing proceeding, the jury decision-making process, and the 
influence of various factors on the outcome of the sentencing decision.” In 
contrast, “relatively little attention has been devoted to jury sentencing in non-
capital cases . . . .”).  
15.  Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 320.  
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imposition of the death penalty. This lack of responsibility stems, in 
part, from the decision by each state to adopt statutory provisions 
that insulate the jury from the impact of their decisions, allowing 
them to feel as if they are not solely responsible for the sentence 
imposed. 16  Such insulation enables jurors to enact more severe 
sentences than they may otherwise enact and undermines the 
credibility of the criminal justice sentencing system.17  
The demonstrated lack of responsibility felt by capital jurors is 
a critical issue, but it is one that effects few defendants.18 On the 
other hand, the lack of responsibility that is similarly perpetuated by 
state processes, and that is felt by jurors in non-capital cases, has a 
significant impact on the justness and consistency of every single 
jury sentence imposed throughout the country. If the goal of the 
criminal justice system is to ensure sentences are reliable and 
equitable, it is important to both increase procedural protections for 
defendants sentenced by juries and to explicitly stress to jurors the 
impact their decisions will have on the defendant. In order to truly 
be sentenced by a jury of one’s peers,19 it is essential for jurors to 
accept responsibility for the choice they have made and the sentence 
they have imposed. By providing the jury more information and 
being explicit about the court’s expectations of jurors, jurors will 
have to directly face the sentences they choose to impose, 
acknowledge their role in the criminal justice system, and 
acknowledge their role in the life of that defendant. The solutions 
proposed in this article draw on studies about promoting attentive 
students in the classroom to similarly create attentive jurors. This 
new approach to creating an engaged jury represents minor steps 
that states can take to ensure their jury sentencing systems are 
operating equitably and non-arbitrarily. While these steps are 
minor, they can significantly contribute to the credibility of jury 
sentences and the criminal justice system in states that continue to 
regularly use sentencing juries. 
                                                 
16 .  Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror 
Instructions in Cap. Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9 (1993) (identifying such 
state action as “imposed ignorance” upon the jury).  
17.  See King, supra note 6, at 198; see also King & Noble, supra note 4, at 
332–33.  
18.  Facts about the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. 1, 1 (2018), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJ4P-
ZYLE] (noting that 1472 people have been executed since 1976).  
19.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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I advance my argument in three parts. In Part I, I explore why 
juror responsibility is so critical to promoting just and non-arbitrary 
sentences. I further analyze the lack of responsibility felt by capital 
jurors and discuss from where that lack of responsibility originates. 
Part II briefly explores jury sentencing in Arkansas, Kentucky, 
Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia. Because no article has 
previously explored the responsibility felt by jurors in the non-
capital context, I analyze the jury sentencing processes that promote 
a lack of responsibility in capital cases that are also utilized in non-
capital cases. I conclude that these processes in capital cases create 
the feeling of a lack of responsibility in non-capital jurors as well. 
Part III outlines a possible framework that would enable jurors to 
feel responsible for the sentences they impose. This framework 
includes efforts to increase juror activism and to increase juror 
comprehension. I conclude that unless such changes are made, jury 
sentences for felons will continue to be arbitrary and will continue 
to cast doubt on the credibility of the sentencing jury that was 
intended to contribute to the Nation’s “peace, liberty, and safety.”20 
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF JUROR RESPONSIBILITY 
At the time the Bill of Rights was drafted, the jury was 
considered critical to prevent governmental overreach and abuse.21 
They were responsible for determining guilt or innocence and based 
on that determination a sentence automatically flowed, making 
jurors “de facto sentencers.”22 Through time, the prominence of the 
sentencing jury has diminished23 with only six states still regularly 
utilizing a sentencing jury. 24  In these states that regularly use 
sentencing juries, the actions the juries take have a significant 
impact on defendants. In these states, jurors remain the bulwark 
against governmental oppression, and their participation is critical 
to ensuring sentences are not arbitrarily imposed.25  In order for 
juries to serve such a function, it is critical that jurors feel 
                                                 
20.  See President Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801).  
21.  Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 168 (2009). 
22.  Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, 
Too Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 692 (2010).  
23.  See id. at 694 (“Over time, a different division of labor evolved between 
judges and juries: juries decided liability; judges sentenced.”).  
24.  King & Noble, supra note 5, at 886. 
25.  Oregon, 555 U.S. at 168.  
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responsible and accountable for the sentences they impose. If jurors 
do not feel responsible for the sentences they impose, and if they do 
not recognize the significant power they wield, they will be more 
likely to apply a sentence to a defendant based on a factor that does 
not speak to the defendant’s ultimate criminal culpability.26 Such a 
decision would be constitutionally impermissible, as it would lead 
to the arbitrary application of punishment. The arbitrary application 
of punishment has been well documented in the capital context.27 In 
fact, it is what led the Supreme Court to temporarily hold the death 
penalty unconstitutional in 1972.28 Here, I explore the importance 
of juror responsibility as a bulwark against governmental 
oppression and as the last defense against the arbitrary imposition 
of punishment. Additionally, I explore the problem that arises when 
jurors in the capital context do not feel responsible for the sentences 
they impose. I evaluate several studies that suggest capital jurors do 
not feel responsible for the sentences they impose, and I explore 
why that is likely the case.  
A.  Why Responsibility Is So Important? 
In Oregon v. Ice, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized “the jury’s 
historic role as a bulwark between the State and the accused at . . . 
trial . . . .”29 This role has its roots in the Sixth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. 30  Such a role requires active 
participation by the jury to prevent governmental oppression. In its 
most basic form, it requires that the jury understand the facts and be 
able to apply the law to those facts. Only when they are able to do 
so both during trial and sentencing can they truly impose just 
sentences that are not based on arbitrary or impermissible factors. 
By understanding the awesome weight of such a role in the criminal 
justice system, the jury accepts responsibility for their verdict and 
is more likely to base their decisions on the defendant’s criminal 
culpability while taking account of all mitigating factors that pertain 
to such culpability.31 In this section, I further analyze the jury’s role 
                                                 
26.  King & Noble, supra note 4, at 332–33. 
27.  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 274 (1972); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 
U.S. 279, 322 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
28.  Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40. 
29.  Oregon, 555 U.S. at 168.  
30.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
31.  See Haney, supra note 13, at 1485–86.  
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as a bulwark against governmental oppression and I discuss how the 
failure to accept responsibility leads to arbitrary and unjust 
sentences.  
1. Jurors Exist as a Bulwark Against Governmental Oppression 
The right to a trial by jury is engrained in the Sixth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution.32 As a result, juries have long 
been perceived as a bedrock of American democracy and as a 
bulwark against the unjust infringement of a defendant’s rights.33 A 
jury of one’s peers is supposed to represent a fair cross section of 
the community and ensure that unjust and harsh sentences are not 
imposed arbitrarily.  
However, in order for a jury to function effectively, a jury must 
have the information and resources they need to find the facts and 
apply the law. 34  “[F]or a jury to effectively convey the moral 
condemnation of the community in a criminal case . . . the jury must 
be provided with tools . . . to adequately and competently exercise 
its responsibility.”35 By preventing the jury from receiving such 
resources, the state is placing paternalistic limitations on the jury.36 
The application of such limitations on the jury creates the 
presumption that such limitations are necessary for the jury to act 
appropriately and suggests that “the jury is unable to shoulder the 
responsibility of governing the decisionmaking [sic] process.”37 If 
the jury is unable to bear this responsibility, then it is the 
government that is really making sentencing decisions. Thus, 
instead of a jury of the defendant’s peers protecting him from 
governmental overreach, the jury yields to the entity from whom 
they are supposed to be protecting the defendant. This sentencing 
structure results “in a reduction in the moral authority that supports 
the process.” 38  To combat such a reduction and to ensure the 
purposes of the Sixth Amendment are effectuated, it is critical that 
                                                 
32.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
33.  Oregon, 555 U.S. at 168. 
34.  Steven I. Friedland, Legal Institutions: The Competency and Responsibility 
of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 190, 192 (1990). 
35.  Id. 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. 
38.  Id. at 207 (quoting In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 
1069, 1093 (3rd Cir. 1980)). 
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jurors are explicitly informed of their responsibility and the impact 
their decision will have on the defendant.  
2. Arbitrary Results 
Procedural safeguards, like jury instructions, are intended to 
ensure that the sentences imposed are just, rather than arbitrary or 
capricious. Such procedural safeguards exist to guide juries in both 
the capital and non-capital context. While these safeguards are 
given special emphasis in the capital context, they are inadequate in 
both the capital context and the non-capital context to combat the 
potentially arbitrary decisions that result.  
In the capital context, the U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized 
that procedural safeguards are intended to help avoid the arbitrary 
application of the death penalty, to guide the jury during sentencing, 
and to allow the jury to understand the weight of their decision.39 In 
fact, in Furman v. Georgia, when the death penalty was briefly ruled 
unconstitutional, it was because the death penalty was being applied 
in an impermissibly arbitrary manner.40 There, the U.S. Supreme 
Court looked to state death penalty statutes and concluded that they 
provided too much unfettered discretion to capital juries.41  This 
unguided discretion was said to be the cause of arbitrary and 
capricious death penalty decisions.42 
The same unfettered discretion that existed among capital juries 
when the death penalty was ruled unconstitutional in 1972 also 
exists today in the non-capital context.43 “Juries in non-capital cases 
face wide-open choices that seem to allow even more room for 
arbitrary, even discriminatory, decision-making than is available in 
the choice between life and death.” 44  The risk of arbitrary 
sentencing in non-capital cases should be of a similar level of 
concern as the risk in capital cases, especially given the additional 
protections that have been adopted in the context of the death 
penalty and have not been adopted in a non-capital context.  
                                                 
39.  Miller, supra note 10, at 1312. 
40.  Furman, 408 U.S. at 274.  
41.  Id. at 298. 
42.  Miller, supra note 10, at 1319. 
43.  King, supra note 6, at 200. 
44.  Id. 
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Granted, this argument may conflict with the “death is 
different,” 45  refrain that motivates significant procedural 
protections and scrutiny in the death penalty context. However, 
because a significant liberty interest is implicated by prison 
sentences as well, arbitrary decision-making should remain a 
concern of the Court just as it is in the capital context. Asserting 
otherwise would undermine the entire criminal justice system and 
contradict the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 46  Arguing that 
arbitrary decision-making should not be a concern of the non-capital 
punishment system would be equivalent to suggesting that juries 
should have free reign to consider any factor or no factors at all in 
their decision-making process—akin to allowing the jury to flip a 
coin to decide the length of sentence a defendant must serve. The 
criminal justice system loses all credibility if it allows juries to 
reduce the choices they are asked to make to a simple coin toss. This 
sentiment was echoed by Justice Clark in Gideon v. Wainwright 
when he asserted that 
[t]he Fourteenth Amendment requires due process of law for the 
deprival of ‘liberty’ just as for the deprival of ‘life,’ and there cannot 
constitutionally be a difference in the quality of the process based 
merely upon a supposed difference in the sanction involved.47 
Thus, even though, “death is different,” 48  an abridgment of 
liberty should not occur arbitrarily. Instead, the jury’s discretion 
should be limited to consideration of the legal factors before them. 
To truly limit their discretion to those factors, it is critical to 
communicate the expectations of the court and the law clearly and 
unambiguously. This need has been uniquely demonstrated by 
studies demonstrating a lack of juror responsibility in the capital 
context, but the same lack of responsibility also is present in the 
non-capital context.   
                                                 
45.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).  
46.     U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(1)(3) (U.S. SENTENC-
NG COMM’N 2018) (“Granting such broad discretion, however, would have risked 
correspondingly broad disparity in sentencing . . . . Such an approach would have 
risked a return to the wide disparity that Congress established the Commission to 
reduce . . . .”). 
47.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349 (Clark, J., concurring).  
48.  Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188. 
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B.  A Lack of Juror Responsibility in the Capital Context 
For a capital sentence to be applied justly rather than arbitrarily, 
jurors must have a sense of responsibility for the awesome power 
that they wield. Jurors are literally making a life or death decision 
upon which the defendant’s fate rests. Numerous studies have 
suggested that if they do not understand the significance of their 
decision, they are likely to make their decision based upon a number 
of different factors that may or may not pertain to the defendant’s 
ultimate culpability. 49  They may even approach the sentencing 
phase of the defendant’s trial with a presumption of death on their 
mind.50 If jurors allow such irrelevant factors to impact the sentence 
they impose, their decision will be marked by the same arbitrariness 
that led the Supreme Court to briefly hold the death penalty 
unconstitutional in 1972.51 Thus, if the death penalty is to continue, 
sentences must be imposed in a non-arbitrary manner, in which 
jurors accept responsibility for the sentences they impose. In this 
section, I analyze this problem and evaluate several studies that 
suggest capital jurors do not feel responsible for the sentences they 
impose. I additionally explore why that is likely the case, and what 
factors help insulate capital jurors from the decisions they make.  
1. Empirical Analysis Demonstrating Capital Juries Do Not Feel 
Responsible for the Sentences They Impose 
In Caldwell v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court held that the 
reliability of a “death sentence depends upon the jury taking its role 
seriously.”52 This holding was narrowed in Romano v. Oklahoma.53 
There, the Court limited Caldwell to instances in which the jury was 
intentionally misled about their responsibility for the sentence they 
chose to impose.54 Regardless of the Court’s limitation of Caldwell 
                                                 
49.  See Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 320; see also Haney, supra note 
13, at 1481; see also King & Noble, supra note 4, at 332. 
50.  Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 318. 
51.  See Furman, 408 U.S. at 274; see also Miller, supra note 10, at 1347 (“A 
jury with a diminished sense of responsibility cannot make a fair and reliable 
determination to impose the death penalty.”). 
52.  See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329 (1985); see also Miller, 
supra note 10, at 1331. 
53.  Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 3 (1994). 
54.  Id.  
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in Romano, the moral of both cases is clear: the jury’s sense of 
responsibility was required for a sentence to be credible.  
Study after study shows, though, that capital jurors do not feel 
this sense of responsibility.55 In fact, in a study of Oregon jurors in 
capital cases, “fully one-half of the Oregon jurors did not believe 
that the death penalty would actually be carried out.” 56  This 
misunderstanding by Oregon jurors was likely a result of the Oregon 
capital sentencing scheme which requires jurors to simply answer 
several questions about aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed.57 These 
questions allow jurors to characterize their interactions with the 
defendant as “not sentencing him to death,” but rather “just 
answering these questions.”58  
This problem is not unique to Oregon. Instead, nationally, 
among capital jurors, “there was a tendency. . .to shift or abdicate 
responsibility of the ultimate decision – to the law, to the judge, or 
to the legal instructions – rather than grapple personally with the life 
and death consequences of the verdicts they were called upon to 
render.”59 As this study suggests, it is much easier for a capital juror 
to blame the law or to see the law as the force driving the 
defendant’s punishment, rather than acknowledging that the driving 
force was the verdict they reached by their own free will. 60  A 
subsequent study found that “overwhelmingly, jurors deny that they 
are primarily responsible for the defendant’s punishment.”61 In fact, 
“eight of ten jurors assign foremost responsibility to the defendant 
(46.6%) or to the law (35.2%).”62  
Beyond those who explicitly assign responsibility for the death 
sentence they choose to impose to other institutional factors or 
                                                 
55.  Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 320; Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. 
Steiker, No More Tinkering: The American Law Institute and the Death Penalty 
Provisions of the Model Penal Code, 89 TEX. L. REV. 353, 402 (2010).  
56.  Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 320.  
57.  Id.; see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 55, at 404 (“Casting the decision 
in terms of aggravation and mitigation and requiring jurors to balance or weigh 
these considerations might false convey to the jurors that their decision is a 
mechanical or mathematical one, rather than one requiring moral judgment.”).  
58.  Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 320. 
59.  Id. 
60.  Id. at 329. 
61.  Id. 
62.  Id. 
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actors, it is also important to note that in one study fifty-four percent 
of capital jurors acted upon a “presumption of death” in which they 
believed the appropriate punishment was death unless they could be 
persuaded otherwise.63 In these cases, the presumption of death was 
a result of the prosecutor’s charging decision and the death 
qualification of the jury. Such processes left the jury thinking 
imposing a death sentence is “what we were there for.”64 Such a 
presumption necessarily abdicates jurors of responsibility. When 
half of the jury believes the answer is death before they even hear 
the case for life, it is easy for them to not accept responsibility for 
the life they chose to take. The ease of that abdication of 
responsibility is a result of the procedures in place that allow capital 
jurors to insulate themselves from the plight of the defendant.  
2. Why Capital Juries Do Not Feel Responsible for the Sentences 
They Impose 
Capital jurors do not feel responsible for the sentences they 
impose because they are not made to. States take little to no action 
to impress upon jurors the weight of their decision and the impact it 
will have on the defendants. 65  Thus, jurors are able to remain 
inactive and unengaged throughout the duration of the sentencing 
proceeding. This inactivity allows jurors to dissociate from the 
sentences they impose, 66  and it allows jurors to assign the 
responsibility for their decision to more active sentencing actors 
with more experience in the criminal justice system, like the 
prosecutor or judge. 67  In addition to assigning responsibility 
elsewhere, jurors are insulated from the decisions they make by 
unclear and ambiguous jury instructions.68 Because jurors are not 
provided the information they need and the expectations of the court 
are not clearly expressed to them, they are forced to make decisions 
                                                 
63.  Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 318. 
64.  Id.  
65.  Haney, supra note 13, at 1449 (States are incentivized to take little action 
because by not insulating jurors from the weight of their decision “a system of 
democratically administered death sentencing would not be possible.”).  
66.  See Friedland, supra note 34, at 192.  
67.  Haney, supra note 13, at 1481. 
68.  Id. at 1484 (“badly framed and poorly understood instructions seem to 
provide jurors with a protective shield that enables them to avoid a sense of 
personal responsibility for their decisions.”).  
12
Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice, Vol. 40 [2019], Art. 2
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/policypractice/vol40/iss1/2
Spring 2019] Grover 35 
 
for which they do not grasp the severity. I discuss each of these 
abdication methods in turn below.  
a. The Shifting of Responsibility to Other Actors 
Jurors in capital cases are provided every opportunity to 
abdicate responsibility for the sentences they choose to impose and 
to shift that responsibility to other actors in the criminal justice 
system, and in fact, “most capital jurors [do] disclaim primary or 
sole responsibility for the awesome life or death decision they 
make.”69 Because capital sentencing involves many different actors 
and the process is rather complicated, it is relatively easy for jurors 
to shift responsibility to someone else in the criminal justice 
system.70 “The result, critics assert, is a capital sentencing system 
that makes sentences at once unreliable and too easy to impose.”71 
If jurors are looking to assign responsibility to another actor, they 
have many options to choose from. They can blame the defendant 
for setting off the sequence of events that led to the crime being 
committed, the defendant being charged, and the defendant being 
eligible for death.72 They can blame the prosecutor for charging the 
defendant capitally and advocating for the death penalty.73 They can 
blame the judge—appellate or otherwise—for being the final actor 
who accepts and finalizes the sentence.74 Jurors may even look to 
the law itself and argue that the death sentence they imposed was 
mandatory.75 In fact, “many capital jurors readily acknowledge the 
sense in which condemning someone to death is ‘not really my 
decision, it’s the law’s decision,’ and they come to believe they are 
just following orders.”76 This argument is most often a result of a 
misunderstanding based on ambiguous and unclear jury 
instructions.77 
                                                 
69. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Jury Responsibility in Capital Sentencing: 
An Empirical Study, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 339, 340 (1996); see also Bowers, supra 
note 11, at 329.  
70.  Eisenberg et al., supra note 69, at 340. 
71.  Id. 
72.  Id. at 341. 
73.  Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 329–30.  
74.  Haney, supra note 13, at 1481. 
75.  Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 329–30. 
76.  Haney, supra note 13, at 1484.  
77.  Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 329–30. 
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b. The Inadequate Resources and Information Provided to Jurors 
The resources provided to juries to help them make their 
decision contributes to the jury’s tendency to shift responsibility to 
elsewhere, further allowing them to insulate themselves from the 
decision they make and the sentence they impose. For example, jury 
instructions are often unclear and written in ways that laymen would 
not readily comprehend. 78  Furthermore, studies suggest that 
ambiguous or unclear jury instructions contribute significantly to 
jury confusion about the meaning of life without parole, parole, and 
good time.79 In Oklahoma and Missouri, jurors are not told at all 
whether the defendant will be parole eligible.80 In Texas, jurors are 
told that while parole exists, they may not consider the manner in 
which parole would be applied to the defendant, and they are given 
no clarification as to what that actually means for their decision-
making process.81 In State v. Torrence, the South Carolina Supreme 
Court went so far as to prohibit the trial judge from instructing jurors 
about possible alternatives to a death sentence, like life without 
parole.82 Instead, the court held that the jury may only be told that 
the terms life imprisonment and death are to be understood by their 
ordinary meaning. 83  Because jurors do not know what these 
instructions mean, jurors regularly believe the defendant will be 
released much earlier than he or she actually will be. 84  This 
misunderstanding leads them to impose harsher punishments than 
they may otherwise in order to fully incapacitate the defendant.85 
Death-qualified juries would often rather sentence someone to death 
                                                 
78.  Haney, supra note 13, at 1483; Johnson, Too Often Juries Comprise 12 
Confused Men (and Women), THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 14, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/books-and-arts/2018/04/13/too-often-juries-
comprise-12-confused-men-and-women [https://perma.cc/6WV8-DVJ7].  
79.  King, supra note 6, at 207; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 55, at 402–03 
(“Jurors tend to misunderstand the consequences of a life without parole verdict, 
and, in jurisdictions that that permit the alternative of life without parole verdict, 
jurors consistently understate the length of time a defendant will remain in prison 
if not sentenced to death.”); Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 7.  
80.  King, supra note 6, at 209.  
81.  TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 37.07 
82.  Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 16, at 8.  
83.  Id. 
84.  Id. at 7–8. 
85.  King & Noble, supra note 4, at 332.  
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than risk a defendant being released decades later.86 Such a concern 
is misguided, though, as it is primarily fueled by juries either not 
being told or simply not understanding that life without parole, truly 
means life without parole.87  
Additionally, jury instructions are often unclear as to whether 
the jury’s decision is actually binding on the court. Jury instructions 
may refer to the sentence the jury chooses to impose as a 
“recommendation,” which suggests to the jury that their decision is 
not binding, when, in reality, they are making a binding 
recommendation. 88  This misunderstanding often leads juries to 
“overestimate the extent to which their sentencing decisions will be 
modified or corrected.”89 It also leads jurors to believe that no one 
will actually be executed as a result of the sentence they choose to 
impose.90 If jurors do not believe executions will be the result of 
their decision, then they may perceive no difference between life 
without parole and the death penalty, and may choose to impose the 
death penalty to send a stronger message to the defendant and to the 
community.91 Finally, the very sentencing guidelines that are meant 
to aid sentencing actors actually help insulate capital juries from the 
death sentences they impose.92 Because they provide jurors with a 
formula for the “correct” punishment, jurors can feel as though their 
decision is simply a formality that requires little consideration.93 
Their decision is reduced to simply checking a box, and it is not one 
that requires the jury to feel anything in regards to the defendant. It 
allows them to remain detached.  
                                                 
86.  See Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 321. 
87.  See David Bruck, Simmons v. South Carolina (1994), in DEATH PENALTY 
STORIES 364–65 (John H. Blume and Jordan M. Steiker, eds. 2009) (“In 
California, for example, where the jury’s non-capital sentencing verdict itself 
read life imprisonment without possibility of parole only about one-fifth of 
former trial jurors interviewed by the Capital Jury Project believed that a 
defendant who received such a sentence would actually spend his whole life in 
prison.”); see also BENJAMIN FLEURY-STEINER, JURORS’ STORIES OF DEATH:  
HOW AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY INVESTS IN INEQUALITY (2004).  
88.  Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 329.  
89.  King, supra note 6, at 207–08. 
90.  Eisenberg et al., supra note 69, at 358.  
91.  See Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 16, at 7. 
92.  Eisenberg et al., supra note 69, at 348. 
93.  Haney, supra note 13, at 1484.  
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These factors that allow capital jurors to avoid responsibility for 
the sentences they impose also exist in the non-capital context, and 
they allow non-capital jurors to avoid responsibility for the 
sentences they choose to impose. The “imposed ignorance” of juries 
and the endemic lack of information provided to juries is prevalent 
throughout the criminal justice system.94 Thus, it would be an easy 
inference to say that the same factors that allow a capital juror to 
avoid responsibility for the sentences they impose, similarly allow 
a non-capital juror to avoid responsibility for the sentences they 
impose. 
III. A LACK OF JURY RESPONSIBILITY IN THE NON-CAPITAL 
CONTEXT 
Today, only six states routinely use juries to sentence non-
capital felons: Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, 
and Virginia. 95  While each state’s jury sentencing scheme is 
somewhat unique, each system does grant wide discretion to jurors. 
Additionally, each system fails to effectively guide the discretion 
that is granted to jurors. In that regard, the non-capital sentencing 
systems are reflections of the capital sentencing systems, discussed 
above, in which there is a demonstrated lack of jury responsibility. 
This lack of responsibility is due in large part to procedural 
protections adopted in both the capital and non-capital context to 
insulate jurors from the choices they make.96 This insulation and the 
lack of responsibility that results is critical to the state securing 
harsher sentences for defendants.97  
Here, I briefly discuss jury sentencing procedures in the states 
that routinely use juries to sentence non-capital felons. 
Additionally, I explore how these non-capital sentencing 
procedures are similar to capital sentencing procedures and discuss 
the deficiencies in both systems.  
                                                 
94.  Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 16, at 9. 
95.  King & Noble, supra note 5, at 886. 
96.  Haney, supra note 13, at 1454.  
97.  King, supra note 6, at 207; King & Noble, supra note 4, at 332. 
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A.  Jury Sentencing in Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, 
Texas, and Virginia 
The sentencing schemes of these states are marked by a lack of 
information provided to the jury. Even when jury instructions are 
given, they are often provided in an unnecessarily complicated form 
that lacks explanations or definitions the jury may need to make 
their determination.98 This lack of clarity tends to have a significant 
impact on the sentences jurors choose to impose. The information 
gap that this lack of clarity propagates has its roots in the laws and 
jury instructions of each state.99 In fact, “not one state gives the jury 
true price-setting authority today, complete with both the power and 
the information needed to set the upper and lower bounds of 
punishment within legislated ranges.”100 The most important pieces 
of information that are kept from jurors are the sentencing 
guidelines, information about parole and good time credit, and the 
reality of what their verdict will actually mean for the defendant. I 
discuss each in turn below.  
1. The Denial of Sentencing Guidelines 
In the non-capital context jurors are often denied access to the 
state’s sentencing guidelines, instead, they are given only broad 
statutory sentencing ranges.101 For example, in Arkansas, Virginia, 
Kentucky, and Missouri juries are explicitly denied access to the 
sentencing guidelines. 102  This leaves jurors with “no 
comprehension that the going rate for a given offense was often 
much lower than the statutory range jurors were given.”103 This 
causes jurors to apply much harsher sentences than might otherwise 
                                                 
98.  Johnson, supra note 78. 
99.  King & Noble, supra note 5, at 888 (“State law in each of these three states 
deprives the jury of either full information or power, to varying degrees.”). 
100.  Id. at 953. 
101. When I refer to sentencing guidelines, I refer to the individual state’s 
sentencing guidelines because those are the guidelines that impact the greatest 
number of defendants. 
102.  King, supra note 6, at 210; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-97-101 (2018); 
2 Arkansas Model Jury Instructions – Criminal AMCI 2d 9102 (2018); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 19.2-298.01 (2018); 1 Cetrulo, Kentucky Instructions to Juries § 12.11 
(2018); MO. REV. STAT. § 557.036 (2018). 
103.  King, supra note 6, at 210. 
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be applied by a judge because judges are provided guidelines ranges 
that narrow the statutory range of punishment available to the 
defendant.104 This trend was analyzed in a study by Nancy King that 
compared the sentence severity and variance of juries and judges in 
non-capital cases.105 In that study, in Arkansas for certain types of 
crime, the average jury sentence exceeded both the average bench 
sentence and the average sentence associated with a guilty plea.106 
Specifically, “when comparing cases resulting in incarceration for 
manufacturing a control substance, bench trial sentences averaged 
95 months while jury trial sentences average 11 years longer—233 
months.”107  This same trend was also shown to be the case in 
Virginia where defendants convicted of possession of a drug with 
intent to distribute received, on average, a jury sentence of fifty-
three months (four years and five months) more than defendants 
who were sentenced by a judge.108 Additionally, a 2001 Virginia 
study found that “less than one-third of sentences after jury trial fell 
within guidelines recommendations, as compared to 80 percent of 
bench and plea dispositions combined.”109 
By refusing to provide jurors with the sentencing guidelines, 
states force jurors to take a stab in the dark as long as they remain 
within the statutory range.110 In Oklahoma, the statute outlining jury 
sentencing procedures does not explicitly discuss whether juries 
should be supplied with sentencing guidelines.111 Instead the statute 
only provides that juries should “assess and declare the punishment 
in their verdict within the limitations by law, and the court shall 
render judgment according to such verdict.”112 While the Oklahoma 
statute avoids the issue all together, the drafters of the Texas statute 
specifically contemplated providing juries with such information, 
but the Committee for Rules “concluded that it could draft no 
instruction that would be of practical value to jurors” because such 
an instruction would be too dense for jurors to be able to 
                                                 
104.  King & Noble, supra note 4, at 332.  
105.  Id. at 344 
106.  Id.  
107.  Id.  
108.  Id. at 351. 
109.  Id. at 354. 
110.  King, supra note 6, at 210. 
111.  OKLA. STAT. § 926.1 (2018). 
112.  Id. 
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understand. 113  Texas justified this decision by arguing that the 
constitution does not mandate that a jury instruction actually guide 
the jury’s decision.114 Because jurors often do not know what the 
sentencing guideline for the defendant is and because their 
discretion is in no way limited, they are left to assess the defendant’s 
criminal culpability without knowing the going rate for the 
defendant’s criminal conduct, and studies show that they tend to 
sentence more harshly because they do not have that guidance.115  
 
2. Denial of Information about Parole and Good Time Credit 
Furthermore, states deny jurors information about parole and 
good time credit. 116  Study after study shows that jurors do not 
understand parole, life without parole, or good time credit. 117 
Without accurate information in this regard, jurors are left with the 
impression that defendants will be released from prison much 
earlier than they actually will.118 As a result, jurors tend to err on 
the high side of the statutory sentencing range to lessen the 
possibility the defendant will be released for their crime any earlier 
than the jury deems appropriate.119 This was evident in Arkansas 
where the sentencing actor was the most significant variable in 
determining the sentence for home burglary.120 There, a defendant 
sentenced by a jury received on average an additional 133 months 
compared to what a defendant sentenced by a judge received.121 
This utter confusion about parole and good time is perpetuated in 
Arkansas, Kentucky, and Oklahoma where such information is 
denied to jurors. 122  Similarly, while the Texas sentencing 
                                                 
113.  Texas Criminal Pattern Jury Charges CPJC § 12.1 (2018). 
114.  Id. 
115.  King, supra note 6, at 210; see also King & Noble, supra note 4, at 332. 
116.  Bruck, supra note 87, at 364–65. 
117.  Id.  
118.  Id. 
119.  Id.; Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 16, at 9; King & Noble, supra note 4, 
at 332.  
120.  King & Noble, supra note 4, at 348 
121.  Id.  
122.  See 2 Arkansas Model Jury Instructions -Criminal § AMCI 2d 8000; see 
also 1 Cetrulo, Kentucky Jury Sections § 12.11 (2018); OKLA. STAT. § 926.1 
(2018); Oklahoma Jury Instructions: OUJI-CR § 10-21. 
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instructions briefly address both parole and good conduct, they does 
so vaguely. 123  They do not provide jurors any information or 
statistics about how much of their sentence defendants tend to 
serve.124 The instructions also do “not permit the introduction of 
evidence on the operation of parole and good conduct time lines.”125 
Such sentencing schemes motivate juries to apply higher sentences 
than they would otherwise apply so as to ensure the retributive and 
incapacitation purposes of the punishment are fully realized prior to 
the defendant being released.126   
 
3. Denial of What a Sentence Means for the Defendant 
In addition to being denied information about what will happen 
to the defendant once they are imprisoned, jurors are also denied 
information about what will be the likely result of the sentence they 
choose or do not choose to impose. For example, in Kentucky, 
traditionally the jury recommended to the court whether the 
sentence should be served concurrently or consecutively. 127 
However, no jury instruction was given to the jury to explain what 
those distinctions mean.128 Additionally, while Kentucky’s statute 
termed the jury’s decisions a recommendation, this 
“recommendation” was binding on the court.129 Likewise, there is 
considerable confusion among jurors regarding what happens when 
a unanimous opinion is not reached.130  
For example, while in Missouri, a non-unanimous sentence 
results in the court determining the sentence that should be 
served,131 in Texas and Virginia, a non-unanimous jury requires the 
court to impanel another jury and try the case a second time.132 The 
Texas and Virginia rules are consistent with what most jurors 
                                                 
123.  TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. § 37.07 (2018). 
124.  Id. 
125.  Id. 
126.  Bruck, supra note 87, at 364–65; King & Noble, supra note 4, at 332.  
127.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.055 (2018).  
128.  1 Cetrulo, Kentucky Instructions to Juries, Criminal § 12.11 (2018). 
129.  Id. 
130.  See FIEURY-STEINER, supra note 88.  
131.  MO. REV. STAT. § 557.036 (2018). 
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understand the reality of a non-unanimous decision to be, but the 
Missouri rule challenges jurors preconceived notions of what a non-
unanimous decision means, and the jury instructions utilized in 
Missouri do not adequately communicate this unique feature.133 The 
misunderstanding that is created by Missouri’s statute ultimately 
leads some jurors to concede rather than proceed as a hung jury 
because they do not want the case to be tried again. 134  Such 
concessions are based on faulty premises, but Missouri does little to 
correct such misunderstandings because the sentence they seek is 
secured.135  
B.  Non-Capital Sentencing Procedures and Capital Sentencing 
Procedures are Similarly Designed and Similarly Motivated 
This trend of a lack of information and clarity in jury 
instructions for non-capital juries also exists in the capital context. 
In fact, “jury sentencing in non-capital cases appears to share 
several features of death sentencing by jury that capital punishment 
critics have long condemned.”136 These shared features include an 
inactive and unengaged jury and a significant information gap 
between what the court expects jurors to understand and what they 
actually understand. In both the capital and non-capital context, 
these features contribute to arbitrariness in sentencing. These 
commonalities and the procedural mechanisms that promote them 
allow jurors to abdicate any sense of responsibility they may feel 
for the sentences they choose to impose, regardless of the potential 
sentence.137  
Like jurors in the capital context, there is no real incentive for 
jurors in the non-capital context to feel responsible for the sentences 
they impose. They are meant to be neutral arbiters. However, by 
allowing jurors to be inactive arbiters, the court is communicating 
to jurors that they do not have to act as responsible individuals. 
Jurors are told to “just listen,” but just listening cannot be effective 
when the average attention span for a middle-aged adult is a mere 
                                                 
133.  MO. REV. STAT. § 557.036 (2018). 
134.  See FIEURY-STEINER, supra note 88. 
135.  See id. 
136.  King, supra note 6, at 214. 
137.  Haney, supra note 13, at 1484.  
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eight seconds.138 By requiring jurors to just listen and preventing 
them from actively engaging, jurors, in both the capital and non-
capital context, are able to avoid responsibility for the sentences 
they impose. This lack of engagement is considered a significant 
problem throughout the criminal justice system, particularly in the 
grand jury context.139 This problem is the reason jurors on the grand 
jury are encouraged to actively engage with the issue before them 
by asking questions of the witnesses to determine whether an 
indictment is appropriate.140  
Furthermore, there is a significant information gap between 
what the court expects jurors to understand, what the court 
understands, and what jurors actually understand. The court 
assumes a certain level of sophistication of its jurors, but the 
information gap that exists prevents jurors from securing the 
information they need to adequately and accurately sentence a 
defendant. Jurors lack important information that judges, who are 
more sophisticated, do not lack. This often leads to defendants 
arbitrarily receiving harsher sentences from juries than from 
judges. 141  This information gap is largely a result of a lack of 
training and clear information for both capital and non-capital 
jurors. 
In a study conducted by Nancy King, this information gap 
between judges and jurors played a significant and similar role in 
both capital and non-capital sentencing. 142  For example, while 
jurors in both settings lack information about parole, good time, and 
concurrent and consecutive sentences, judges have that information 
by nature of their positions and education.143 The jury’s lack of a 
legal education creates a significant hurdle for jurors as they attempt 
to understand the instructions they are given.144 “Several studies 
have suggested that jurors do not understand either the words used 
                                                 
138.  Kevin McSpadden, You Now Have a Shorter Attention Span Than a 
Goldfish, TIME (May 14, 2015), http://time.com/3858309/attention-spans-
goldfish/ [https://perma.cc/VJD4-HE6U].  
139.  Friedland, supra note 34, at 205.  
140.  Id.  
141.  Id. at 195; see also King & Noble, supra note 4, at 332.  
142.  Friedland, supra note 34, at 209. 
143.  Id.  
144.  Id. at 197. 
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in the instructions or the overall meaning, disabling the jurors from 
adequately applying those instructions of the evidence in a case.”145  
Even information the sentencing actor does not currently have 
is more readily available to the judge than the jurors. 146  This 
information gap is largely a result of differing levels of legal 
education among jurors and judges and of different procedural 
mechanisms that allow judges to receive information jurors cannot 
receive.147 Additionally, this information gap stems from the nature 
of the judge’s role in the criminal justice system. While judges are 
exposed to more violent crimes and can likely better evaluate where 
the defendant and crime fit on a criminal culpability scale, “a juror 
sentencing for the very first time likely views each offender as the 
worst criminal she’s ever seen.”148 As a result, this gap often leads 
jurors to make sentencing decisions based on irrelevant and 
arbitrary factors rather than those factors required by law and laid 
out in complicated jury instructions.149 
IV. ENCOURAGING JURY RESPONSIBILITY 
Study after study has shown that capital jurors do not feel 
responsible for the sentences they choose to impose.150 This lack of 
responsibility prevents jurors from appreciating the weight of the 
decisions they make and leads juries to decide cases based on 
arbitrary factors. The procedures that deny information and clarity 
to capital jurors insulate them from feeling this sense of 
responsibility. Those same procedures are utilized to deny 
information and clarity to non-capital jurors, allowing them to also 
abdicate responsibility for the sentences they impose. Just as this 
lack of responsibility is problematic for capital jurors, it is 
problematic for non-capital jurors who may consider arbitrary 
factors to make their sentencing decision. Here, I propose a solution 
to this problem that would ensure that non-capital jurors are not able 
to abdicate responsibility for the choices they make.  
                                                 
145.  Id.; Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 16, at 9; Haney, supra note 13, at 1483.  
146.  See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. § 37.07 (2018) (allowing the judge to 
order a presentencing report, while jurors may not). 
147.  Id.; King & Noble, supra note 4, at 357–58.  
148.  See King, supra note 6, at 207. 
149.  King & Noble, supra note 4, at 344.  
150.  Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 320. 
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A.  Increase Jury Activism 
As previously discussed, clear and unambiguous information is 
key to getting a jury engaged in a sentencing hearing and 
subsequently helping them feel the weight of their decision in that 
hearing. An active jury is a responsible jury that produces reliable 
sentences.151 There are many possible ways to create an engaged 
and responsible jury. They range from attempting to create an 
attentive jury who understands what is going on, to training the jury, 
to clarifying instructions for the jury as they make their ultimate 
decision. A combination of these methods is critical to ensuring that 
juries feel responsible for the sentences they impose. By utilizing a 
combination of these mechanisms, the court can ensure that if one 
method of engagement does not reach a juror, another method may.  
The challenge of creating an environment that promotes an 
attentive jury is like the challenge all teachers face as they try to 
create an environment in which their students can learn and focus. 
Important in an educational context is note taking and asking 
questions. 152  Such methods should likewise be utilized in the 
courtroom.153 Studies have demonstrated the value in taking notes 
by hand in a classroom.154 By allowing jurors to take notes, such 
value can also be realized in the courtroom and jurors can better 
focus on the issues at hand. Additionally, “since jurors are the ones 
entrusted with the responsibility of resolving issues, it appears 
                                                 
151.  Friedland, supra note 34, at 192 (“This more active jury role is intended 
to provide juries with an authority commensurate with their responsibility for 
resolving issues at trial. Proponents contend that the active jury model would 
encourage juries to become more attentive and responsible through increased 
participation in the process.”).  
152.  The Importance of Note-Taking, CAMBRIDGE NETWORK (Apr. 18, 2017), 
https://www.cambridgenetwork.co.uk/news/the-importance-of-note-taking/ 
[https://perma.cc/A4RU-YLPS] (citing the benefits of notetaking as assisting 
memory, helping comprehension, providing a useful record, and providing a 
platform for writing.); Ronald D. Vale, The Value of Asking Questions, 24(6) 
MOL. BIOL. CELL 680, 681 (2013) (“Virtually all educators agree that teaching . . 
. should involve more inquiry-based learning and less fact-based 
memorization.”).  
153.  Friedland, supra note 34, at 204. 
154 . Joseph R. Boyle & Gina A. Forchelli, Note-Taking, OXFORD BIBLI-
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logical to at least permit the jury to supplement – with the 
framework of limitations prescribed by the process, such as the rules 
of evidence – the questioning of witnesses.” 155  Such questions 
would certainly need to be limited and most likely funneled through 
the judge, but the value of creating engaged and responsible jurors 
outweighs the minor administrative burden that might result from 
such questioning. Allowing jurors to think critically about the things 
they are told and ask questions when they have them will surely help 
them be active and invested participants in the trial the same way 
such strategies help students be active and invested participants in 
their classrooms. 
B.  Increase Juror Comprehension and Understanding 
In addition to encouraging jurors to be active participants in the 
trial, the court should train jurors on what to do when they face 
significant problems or have procedural questions. As previously 
discussed, jurors do not have the legal expertise the judge or the 
attorneys in the case have, but this lack of practical experience 
should not be a bar to enabling a juror to take responsibility for their 
choices. Thus, special trainings for jurors on how to engage with the 
case are critical. These trainings would cover topics like how and in 
what scenarios juror questions, like those proposed above, would be 
appropriate. Trainings would also provide jurors with information 
on “how to do its job, particularly in resolving disputes and avoiding 
deadlocks.”156 These trainings would also teach jurors what to do in 
the case of a hung jury and what having a hung jury actually means 
in the jurisdiction they are in. Such trainings would have no 
substantive legal component or implications but would simply 
provide procedural guidance to juries that may allow them to 
function more effectively. 
Finally, revised jury instructions “should focus on reducing 
complexity and communicating clearly the sentencer’s awesome 
obligation to make an irreducible moral judgment about the 
defendant’s fate.”157 Jury instructions should be clarified so they are 
more easily understood by jurors who do not have the legal 
experience.158 It should not be the case that  
                                                 
155.  Friedland, supra note 34, at 208. 
156.  Id. at 204. 
157.  Steiker & Steiker, supra note 55, at 404.  
158.  Johnson, supra note 78.  
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after having heard the sentencing instructions read to them three 
times . . . almost a third [of jurors tested] provided definitions [of 
mitigation] that border on being uninterpretable or incoherent, and 
slightly more than one subject on hand was so mystified by the 
concept that he or she was unable to venture a guess as to its 
meaning.159 
Clarity and unambiguity are key to increasing juror 
comprehension in this regard.160 
 Jury instructions should be explicit about the issues the jury 
should consider and what the jury’s responsibilities are. Jurors 
should be explicitly and regularly instructed “that the decision they 
are about to make is, despite its legal trappings, a moral one and 
that, in the absence of legal error, their judgement will be final.”161 
They should also be explicitly informed that the responsibility for 
the sentence they impose belongs to them, and only them. Jurors 
who are contemplating sentences for defendants should have to 
acknowledge that the sentence they choose to impose has an impact 
on that defendant’s life, and in considering that impact, they should 
have to acknowledge that the choice they make is one for which 
they bear responsibility. Furthermore, “sentencing guidelines for 
juries, instructions to jurors requiring that they find certain 
aggravating facts before high-end sentences can be imposed, or 
even more rigorous appellate review might help to standardized jury 
sentencing in non-capital cases.”162  
Repetition is also important to increasing juror 
comprehension.163 People retain information the more they hear it, 
the more they see it, and the more they have to wrestle with it.164 
                                                 
159.  Haney, supra note 13, at 1484. 
160.  Id. at 1483 (“Psychologists know generally that, ‘through convoluted 
verbiage, destructive conduct is made benign and people who engage in it are 
relieved of a sense of personal agency.’ Yet the convoluted verbiage of the capital 
jury instructions distances jurors from the realities of the impending decision.”). 
161.  Eisenberg et al., supra note 69, at 379–80. 
162.  King, supra note 6, at 197. 
163.  Focus & Repetition in Learning, APL NEXTED (2018), https://aplnexted-
.com/blog/best-practices-for-teaching/Focus-and-Repetition-in-Learning 
[https://perma.cc/YC8R-VRJG] (“Repetition is a key learning aid because it 
helps transition a skill from the conscious to the subconscious.”).  
164.  Id.  
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Thus, jury instructions should be given early in the trial and repeated 
throughout the sentencing stage of the trial. They should not be 
reserved for only the end of the sentencing argument. By providing 
jurors with their instructions early and repeatedly, jurors can filter 
the testimony they hear through the lens of the law they learned 
from the jury instructions. When a juror knows why they are 
listening to something and what its relevance is, they are more likely 
to retain that information and to be more readily able to apply it.165 
Because so much of the lack of responsibility felt by jurors for the 
sentences they impose is a result of unclear expectations and 
ambiguous information provided to jurors, it is obvious that no plan 
to address such lack of responsibility would be complete without 
attempting to address the expectation and information gap that 
prevents the jury from being fully informed.  
Utilizing some iteration of all of these techniques to combat the 
lack of responsibility felt by jurors in non-capital sentencing is 
critical to address the information gap that feeds such lack of 
responsibility. Because a lack of information is the primary 
motivating factor behind the lack of responsibility in non-capital 
cases, providing jurors every tool to secure such information is 
critical. With such information comes the autonomy to make a 
choice and the ultimate responsibility for such choice. “If the 
ultimate responsibility for the outcome of a case lies with the jury, 
the responsibility should be complemented by a corollary predicate 
freedom of the jury to have some input, albeit regulated, into 
deciding what information is necessary for the jury to resolve 
relevant issues.”166 There is no just reason why then the court should 
continue to deny the jury information that could aid them in 
producing a just result. The strongest argument against 
implementing such procedures is the increased administrative 
burden such mechanisms may create. However, if the goal of the 
criminal justice system is promoting justice, then providing juries 
with the information they need to make informed and responsible 
sentencing choices can only advance such a goal.  
                                                 
165.  See Barbara Oakley, Science Says This is the Best Way to Learn and 




166.  Friedland, supra note 34, at 209. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In order for sentences to be just, someone must wrestle with the 
implications of a sentence on both the defendant and the 
community. In states where juries are used in the sentencing of 
defendants, the jury is that someone who must be accountable for 
the implications of the sentence they choose to impose. This sense 
of responsibility should lead to sentences that are no harsher or more 
arbitrary than need be within the constitutional framework that 
requires an individualized assessment of culpability in 
sentencing. 167  In reality though, jurors are not encouraged or 
enabled to assume a sense of responsibility for their decisions.  
The lack of responsibility felt by the non-capital jury is a stain 
on the jury as an institution. The jury was intended to be a bulwark 
against governmental overreach,168 but in reality, the jury is denied 
the information and power they need to be such a defense. Until 
such a time in which the jury is given the power and the information 
needed to decide cases responsibly and non-arbitrarily, the 
institution will retain its current stain. In order to combat such a 
problem, it is critical to create an attentive jury, to train the jury, and 
to fully inform the jury. Taking such steps will help establish an 
informed and involved jury, and an informed and involved jury is a 




                                                 
167.  King & Noble, supra note 4, at 332. 
168.  Oregon, 555 U.S. at 168. 
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